Dear Rt Hon Damian Hinds,

Thank you again for facilitating the response from Baroness Taylor (MC2025/08965) regarding my request for a profit cap mechanism in planning.

For clarity, I have included my original letter of request to clearly set out the focus of my proposal. As you will see, my request was specific: I sought your support for the implementation of a profit cap mechanism within Section 106 agreements under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. This mechanism is intended to address the issue of excessive developer profits and ensure that public interest obligations are fully and fairly met.

Having now carefully reviewed the ministerial response, I have prepared a detailed analysis table (also attached) which highlights how the reply:

• Does not address the core question of whether a profit cap will be considered;
• Repeats existing viability policies which are separate and unrelated to a profit cap;
• Avoids providing evidence or justification for key assumptions;
• And sidesteps both enforcement issues and the ethical dimensions I raised.

I would like to ask whether, based on this evidence, you might consider taking further action—either by challenging the department directly for a substantive reply, or by raising the issue via parliamentary channels (such as a written question or Select Committee engagement).

Thank you again for your continued support and for considering this request.

Warm regards,

Attached Analysis Table:

Baroness Taylor’s Response (MC2025/08965)	My Understanding of What It Means	Why This Fails to Address My Profit Cap Proposal

“The Government remains committed to ensuring that development benefits communities and nature alike.”

This is a general reassurance that development should bring public benefits.

✔️ This is generic and does not mention the profit cap mechanism I proposed. It’s a standard political statement without substance.

“In December 2023, we published a revised NPPF with new Golden Rules for planning obligations and contributions.”

This refers to existing or new guidance under the NPPF.

✔️ This is irrelevant to my proposal. Updating guidance on planning obligations does not implement a profit cap or limit excessive developer profits.

“The Golden Rules make clear that contributions should be expected and only negotiated where genuinely necessary.”

This asserts that negotiation is now limited and stricter.

❗ This is misleading. In practice, negotiation remains standard. Importantly, this does not address my proposal to cap developer profits after permission is granted.

“We are updating planning guidance to improve the effectiveness of developer contributions, and to clarify when viability is relevant.”

This outlines further updates to the viability process.

✔️ Again, this refers only to viability tests—not to profit caps. It avoids the core of my proposal.

“Viability helps strike a balance between developers’ and landowners’ returns and the public interest.”

This defends the current viability system as fair and balanced.

❗ This is a mischaracterisation. Viability testing determines the minimum acceptable return—it does not cap maximum profit. My proposal for a profit cap is completely evaded here.

“We expect viability to be considered at the plan-making stage, with issues resolved up front.”

This suggests that viability is being “front-loaded” to improve certainty.

✔️ Even if viability is considered earlier, there is still no mechanism to cap excessive profit. This remains irrelevant to my core proposal.

“The Planning Practice Guidance is clear that 15-20% of GDV is a suitable return assumption.”

This simply restates the current viability benchmark.

❗ This avoids my request for a profit cap. It reaffirms the existing benchmark without explaining why no maximum profit limit is being considered.

“The 15-20% figure is a starting point but may vary based on site circumstances.”

This acknowledges that there is flexibility in how viability is assessed.

✔️ This shows subjectivity but does not explain how to prevent developers from earning well beyond this range.

“Ultimately, councils are responsible for deciding what weight to give to viability assessments.”

This places responsibility on local authorities to decide how to handle viability.

❗ This shifts accountability to local councils and avoids national leadership on implementing the profit cap I proposed. It does not address my request for national-level reform.

Key Summary

This table demonstrates that the ministerial response systematically:

• Avoids answering the specific question of implementing a profit cap;
• Reiterates viability guidance, which deals with minimum acceptable returns—not maximum profit limits;
• Provides no evidence or data to back up key assumptions (e.g., the 15–20% GDV figure);
• And entirely ignores enforcement and ethical concerns, despite these being clearly raised in my original request.

P.S.

It is also telling that this issue was entirely overlooked in the ministerial reply, despite the fact that many comparable countries (such as the Netherlands, Singapore, Sweden, and parts of the USA) either maintain tight public control over development or require strong transparency and enforceable limits when developers seek concessions. In contrast, the UK’s reliance on GDV-based viability assessments—without robust transparency, re-checks, or meaningful penalties—creates a system that practically invites exploitation and allows developers to hide behind claims of “commercial sensitivity,” even when the public bears the cost.

Additional Context for Consideration

For your discretion, I have prepared the following comparative table, which summarises how other countries approach viability, profit control, and transparency in development. I hope this may be useful in supporting your position and strengthening any further engagement you may choose to pursue.

I truly believe that this is a major opportunity to tackle a key structural flaw in the UK housing system—an issue that has far-reaching consequences for affordability, trust in planning, and the quality of life of future generations. Meaningful reform in this area could be a defining achievement in addressing the housing crisis.

Below is a comparative table showing how other countries manage developer viability, profit controls, and transparency. These examples highlight alternative models that ensure public interest is fully protected—contrasting with the current UK approach.

Country	Core Model for Viability & Profit Oversight	Transparency & Enforcement	Relevance to UK Weaknesses
🇳🇱 Netherlands	Municipalities own and prepare land. Developers bid for plots in transparent tenders, with public-interest obligations built into contracts.	Open financial process. Municipalities enforce strict delivery timelines and penalties for underperformance.	Avoids reliance on viability assessments entirely. Limits profit by controlling land and price from the outset.
🇩🇪 Germany	Public-private partnerships. Profit margins are negotiated upfront, contractually fixed, and tied to obligations.	High transparency; enforcement through strict contracts with financial penalties.	Direct negotiation + binding contracts prevent windfall profits. Clear accountability if obligations are missed.
🇸🇬 Singapore	State owns nearly all land. Land is leased via public tenders with fixed conditions. No viability debates.	Full public control. Developers cannot sidestep obligations or game profit margins.	Removes profit gaming entirely. Shows how public ownership + clear rules = full control over delivery and profit.
🇸🇪 Sweden	Local governments have strong powers. Development agreements include enforceable obligations and transparent assumptions.	Public disclosure of key financial assumptions; local watchdogs review delivery.	Transparency + enforcement mechanisms prevent manipulation of viability. Public trust is prioritised over developer privacy.
🇺🇸 USA (e.g., California)	Developers seeking concessions (e.g., density bonuses) must submit detailed, open-book viability assessments.	Transparency enforced through public hearings and auditable reports. Clawback clauses are standard in some areas.	Stronger transparency and post-approval monitoring. Limits abuse of viability tests by exposing data to public review.
🇫🇷 France	Viability often part of public sector-led urban projects. Large-scale developments subject to public reviews and transparent costings.	Obligations are binding and monitored. Adjustments require formal justification.	Mixed model but shows greater openness + legal binding of obligations.
🇬🇧 United Kingdom	Developer-led viability tests; councils rely on self-reported data. Minimal enforcement post-permission.	Developers can keep viability assessments confidential (commercial sensitivity). No national mandatory clawback or profit cap.	Light-touch regulation + weak enforcement + low transparency. System allows developers to exploit GDV-based assumptions and avoid full delivery.

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