📜 Submission to Rt Hon Damian Hinds MP

This submission was delivered in person to Rt Hon Damian Hinds MP on 30 May 2025 in Alton, Hampshire.

Dear Rt Hon Damian Hinds,

This is a formal request for political leadership on what may be the most dangerously overlooked national threat in modern Britain.

The UK housing crisis is no longer merely a matter of affordability. It is a structural failure with far-reaching consequences for sovereignty, public trust, national resilience, and the long-term viability of our land, ecosystems, and democratic institutions.

The six legislative proposals enclosed are not isolated reforms. Together, they form a coherent legal framework to address what is now a uniquely British emergency — one enabled by policy gaps, regulatory capture, and exploitative financial models that our current system not only tolerates, but in some cases rewards.

We face a system marked by:

  • Legalised extraction of value from land without reinvestment into the communities that generated it,
  • Systematic degradation of infrastructure and public services through speculative, uncoordinated delivery,
  • Erosion of democratic oversight, as land is acquired, banked, or promoted by entities operating through offshore holding structures or limited-liability SPVs,
  • And generational displacement, as land and housing are treated not as civic infrastructure, but as speculative instruments — indifferent to long-term livability or environmental impact.

⚠️ Why This Threat Is Uniquely Dangerous in the UK


Unlike many European democracies, the UK currently has:

  • No national framework to regulate developer profitability,
  • No statutory obligation to align housing delivery with infrastructure readiness or environmental thresholds,
  • No enforceable rules requiring ownership transparency during the planning process,
  • And no licensing regime to prevent repeated abuse by known bad actors.

At the same time, many of the UK’s largest developers — including publicly listed firms — operate through offshore holding structures or tax-efficient arrangements. These structures fragment liability, conceal profit flows, and sever ownership from delivery responsibility.

This creates a planning environment where:

  • Permissions are hoarded, not delivered,
  • Land is commodified, not planned,
  • Profit is extracted invisibly, not reinvested,
  • And public and environmental costs are offloaded onto future generations.

This is not market failure. It is state-enabled legal extraction — on a scale and with a level of impunity few other democracies would accept.

🧭 What’s at Stake


If this trajectory continues unchecked, Britain risks:

  • National security exposure, as development land is controlled by offshore or unaccountable entities,
  • Civic fragmentation, as communities lose faith in fair process and infrastructure collapses under speculative growth,
  • Environmental exhaustion, as poor development patterns overwhelm local ecosystems,
  • And irreversible loss of sovereignty, not by conflict, but by legal inaction and regulatory decay.

The land is still ours — but only if we act now, with law, clarity, and structural accountability.

🔑 Purpose of This Submission


The six strategic interventions are outlined in full at the links below. Each page presents:

  • The problem it addresses,
  • Proposed national and local actions,
  • Legislative mechanisms, and
  • Precedents or implementation paths.

These are not abstract proposals. They are:

  • Evidence-based,
  • Structurally proportionate,
  • And entirely achievable within existing legislative frameworks.

They are grounded in the principles of:

  • Transparency — Know who owns, who profits, who is responsible.
  • Sustainability — Align planning with infrastructure and environmental limits.
  • Accountability — License those who operate; exclude those who abuse.
  • Fairness — Reinvest what is extracted; stop value leakage from public land.

These reforms aim to:

  • Recognise housing and land control as strategic infrastructure and security matters,
  • Reverse legalised value extraction through profit caps, clawback tools, and ownership transparency,
  • Equip local authorities and Parliament with the tools to block abuse, deliver sustainably, and restore trust,
  • And protect the right of future generations to live in communities that are viable, just, and built for the public good.

The British public rightly expects that land granted development value should serve the national interest — not be diverted into private offshore gain or speculative asset cycles.

With urgency,

——————

EHDC Is Partly to Blame for Rising Housing Targets

🧩 Key Concepts


  • Affordability Ratio: How expensive houses are compared to people’s earnings.
  • Housing Supply: Homes that are actually built.
  • Housing Demand: How many homes are needed.
  • Land Banking: Developers getting permission but not building.
  • Allocated Land: Land marked for housing in the Local Plan but not used yet.
  • Windfall Development: Speculative, often unplanned housing that jumps the queue.
  • EHDC’s Powers (Mₑₕdc): Tools East Hampshire District Council can use to manage all this.
  • Used Powers (Uₑₕdc): The tools the council is actually using.

🧰 What Powers Does EHDC Have?


EHDC has a lot of tools it could use to make sure houses get built on time, and to stop developers from gaming the system, such as:

  • Releasing land in stages only when infrastructure (like roads and schools) is ready.
  • Making clear in planning policy that land-banking is discouraged.
  • Setting conditions in planning permissions that require timely building.
  • Naming and shaming slow developers in public reports.
  • Replacing land that isn’t being used with new, better-performing sites.
  • Only giving new sites to developers with good past delivery records.
  • Asking national government for more power to act on land-banking.

🧠 What’s the Logic?


The government sets local housing targets partly based on how expensive homes are (compared to income). If not enough homes get built, prices go up—and the target gets even higher.

EHDC has the power to help improve this by making sure:

  • Land with planning permission actually gets used,
  • Developers stop sitting on land and waiting for values to rise,
  • Speculative “extra” applications aren’t rewarded,
  • And local housing supply starts catching up with demand.

But EHDC hasn’t used all the tools at its disposal.

So what happens?

  • Developers delay building (land banking continues),
  • Speculative developments get approved anyway,
  • New homes don’t get built fast enough,
  • House prices keep rising faster than wages,
  • The “affordability uplift” in the government’s formula kicks in,
  • And EHDC’s housing targets go up.

✅ Conclusion (Plainly Stated)


Rising housing targets in East Hampshire aren’t just the fault of national government or the housing market. EHDC is helping cause the problem by not using all the powers it has to:

  • Make sure homes get built when they’re supposed to,
  • Discourage speculative building,
  • And manage how housing supply affects prices.

In short, EHDC’s inaction is part of the reason housing targets keep going up.

EHDC’s Failure to Use Available Powers Has Contributed to Rising Housing Targets

🔢 Definitions


Let:

  • Aₜ = Affordability ratio at time t = average house price ÷ average earnings
  • HSₜ = Total housing supply delivered at time t
  • HDₜ = Total housing demand at time t
  • Pᵤ = Permitted sites not delivered (land banked)
  • Lₐ = Land allocated in the Local Plan but not brought forward
  • W = Windfall (speculative) development outside the Local Plan
  • Mₑₕdc = Set of powers and tools available to EHDC to manage delivery and control speculation
  • Uₑₕdc = Powers actually used by EHDC at time t
  • HTₜ = Housing Target at time t (as calculated by government formulas, including affordability uplift)

🔧 Available Powers: Mₑₕdc


EHDC’s mechanisms to improve delivery and resist speculation include:

  1. Local Plan Delivery Phasing
    • Allocation policy requiring application and delivery within defined timelines
    • Phased land release tied to infrastructure triggers
  2. Refusal Weighting in Planning Policy
    • Local Plan or SPD language deprioritising windfall applications from developers who control undelivered allocated land
  3. Planning Position Statements (PPS)
    • Non-statutory guidance stating that speculative applications from land-bankers are discouraged
  4. Section 106 Legal Agreements
    • Delivery milestones tied to development commencement or occupancy
    • Infrastructure-first triggers
  5. Authority Monitoring Reports (AMRs)
    • Public flagging of under-delivered sites and developer performance
  6. Site Deallocation Review Policy
    • Triggering re-evaluation or replacement of undelivered allocations during Plan updates
  7. Strategic Site Selection Screens
    • Conditioning new allocations on past delivery performance of landowners
  8. Lobbying for Legislative Reform
    • Motion to government to seek legal powers to penalise land banking

📌 Premises


  1. Government housing targets (HTₜ) are calculated using a formula that includes:
    • Baseline need (from demographic trends), and
    • Affordability uplift (linked to Aₜ, the affordability ratio).
  2. Aₜ increases when supply is constrained:
    If HSₜ < HDₜ, then average house prices rise faster than earnings ⇒ Aₜ ↑.
  3. EHDC has multiple powers (Mₑₕdc) that can help:
    • Accelerate HSₜ (housing supply),
    • Reduce speculative incentives (W),
    • Enforce timely use of allocated land (Lₐ), and
    • Track and respond to delivery delays (Pᵤ).
  4. But EHDC’s actual use of these powers is incomplete:
    Uₑₕdc ⊂ Mₑₕdc
    ⇒ i.e., some available tools are unused or underused.
  5. Consequently:
    • Land banking (Pᵤ) and allocation delays (Lₐ) continue,
    • Speculative development (W) fills the gap but worsens infrastructure delivery and affordability,
    • HSₜ stays suppressed, even if land is “available” on paper.
  6. The suppressed supply leads to rising Aₜ, which causes:
    • A higher affordability uplift in the national housing formula,
    • An increased Housing Target (HTₜ) for EHDC.

🔁 Construction


  1. Let HSₜ = f(Pᵤ, Lₐ, W, policy enforcement)
  2. If Uₑₕdc < Mₑₕdc, then Pᵤ and Lₐ remain inactive, and W increases
  3. ⇒ HSₜ < HDₜ
  4. ⇒ Aₜ ↑ (affordability ratio worsens)
  5. ⇒ Affordability uplift ↑ in housing formula
  6. HTₜ ↑ (housing targets rise)

Therefore:

EHDC’s underuse of its own delivery and anti-speculation mechanisms directly leads to increased housing targets.

📎 Conclusion


The rise in EHDC’s housing targets (HTₜ) is not an unavoidable outcome of national policy or external market conditions alone. It is mathematically and procedurally linked to the Council’s own failure to fully utilise available powers (Mₑₕdc) to:

  • Enforce delivery on permitted and allocated land,
  • Discourage speculative windfall development,
  • And actively manage the relationship between housing supply and affordability.

Thus, EHDC is partially responsible for the increase in Aₜ and the resulting inflation of housing targets, by failing to activate the full suite of tools designed to prevent this very outcome.

🛑 Basel 3.1 Will Crush Housing Delivery 💥 Here’s How to Fix It — Before It’s Too Late

🚨 What’s Happening?


In 2025, Basel 3.1 rules will hit UK banks.

They force banks to treat housing development loans as ultra-risky, meaning:

  • Higher capital = more expensive loans 💸
  • Shorter terms = fewer viable projects 🧱
  • Less lending = fewer homes built 🏚️

📉 Estimated Impact:

🚫 20,000–25,000 fewer homes per year
(Source: UK Finance, BPF)

And guess what?
The developers who survive this? The big ones.
Everyone else? Crushed.

❌ Why It’s Worse in the UK


  • We scrapped our regional planning system (RDAs)
  • LEPs have no planning or funding powers
  • Local councils are left to fend for themselves
  • There’s no one to coordinate infrastructure, de-risk sites, or back SME builders

👉 Basel 3.1 hits a broken system — and will break it further.

🛠️ What Needs to Happen — Now


1️⃣ Fix Basel for Housing

✅ Carve out housing loans from harsh Basel rules
✅ Apply lower risk weights for SME, affordable, and regeneration loans
✅ Recognise housing as essential social infrastructure

2️⃣ Create a National Housing Delivery Bank


✅ Low-interest loans for builders shut out of Basel lending
✅ Risk-sharing for land, brownfield, and infrastructure
✅ Prioritise SMEs, co-ops, self-builders, and local delivery

3️⃣ Restore Strategic Planning


✅ Reintroduce statutory regional planning powers
✅ Let Combined Authorities coordinate housing + infrastructure
✅ End the planning chaos and give banks confidence to lend long-term

4️⃣ Protect Developer Diversity


✅ Reserve land for SMEs, community-led, and innovative builders
✅ Make funding and planning accessible by design
✅ Break the monopoly of 10 volume housebuilders

📌 Final Message to Policymakers


If you don’t act, Basel 3.1 + a broken planning system = a housing collapse in slow motion.

You’ll get:

  • Less housing
  • Worse housing
  • Fewer builders
  • Bigger developers with all the power

👉 This isn’t reform — it’s regression.
🛑 Fix it now, or own the crisis later.

Public Review: Why the Tilbury Report to Medstead Parish Council Cannot Be Relied Upon to Assess Judicial Review Risk

🧭 Legal Recognition: Preliminary Review Suggests Material Issues


Richard Buxton Solicitors — a leading UK law firm in environmental, planning, and public law — were invited to give a preliminary view on the Judicial Review (JR) potential of East Hampshire District Council’s (EHDC) approval of application 55318/001 (Beechlands Road, Medstead).

Their founder, Richard Buxton, responded personally. In a voicemail message, he stated:

“My gut reaction is that… it seems to me the sort of situation where you’ve identified a problem which does need to be looked at properly.”

This response was based on an initial three-point summary table outlining the core legal concerns:

  1. Misapplication of the Tilted Balance
  2. Improper Officer Influence / Legal Misdirection
  3. EIA Screening Misuse / Expired Opinion
IssueSummarySupporting Evidence / Legal Authority
1. Misapplication of the Tilted Balance  During the EHDC Planning Committee meeting on 20 March 2025, Cllr Angela Glass — described in the meeting as having “significant experience of determining applications under the tilted balance” — stated:   “…I really feel — however much my heart may say that fields perhaps should not be developed — I actually think that if this were to go to appeal, we would probably lose that appeal, because I think this would be deemed to be acceptable — whether sustainable or not…”   Full video recording:🔗 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u3KU94j2bgE&t=14s  R (Smech Properties Ltd) v Runnymede BC [2016] EWHC 2512 (Admin) – confirms planning judgment must not be replaced by speculative reasoning.NPPF 11(d)(ii) – tilted balance only applies if adverse impacts do not significantly and demonstrably outweigh benefits.
2. Improper Officer Influence / Legal Misdirection  When councillors raised concerns about walkability, infrastructure, and sustainability, the Chief Planning Officer repeatedly cited past appeal outcomes, implying that similar refusals had been overturned and discouraging site-specific objections.   This may have shifted the committee’s rationale toward appeal risk avoidance rather than policy-based planning judgment.   Video recordings: 🔗 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z43D1xxqdWA&t=39s 🔗 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pnhCrTDZkpU&t=89s    R (Wright) v Resilient Energy [2014] EWHC 3136 (Admin) – fairness and transparency must characterise the decision process.R   (Morge) v Hampshire CC [2011] UKSC 2 – councillors must make their own decisions, not defer to officers.   RTPI Code of Conduct – requires planning officers to act impartially.   NPPF Paragraph 38 and PPG para 19 – decisions must be made based on the development plan and site-specific material considerations.
3. EIA Screening Misuse / Expired Opinion  The land was previously the subject of an EIA screening request in 2013 by Foreman Homes. In 2024, Bargate Homes applied to develop the same land (62 dwellings), and officers claimed that no new screening was needed because the number of homes was lower than the 144 originally proposed.   However: – The 2013 opinion was issued under older regulations; – Screening opinions expire after 3 years under the 2017 EIA Regulations; – EIA opinions are not transferrable between applicants; – Cumulative impact was not assessed, despite 48.14% population growth in Medstead (2011–2021), absorbing over 8.36% of all new EHDC housing.EIA Regulations 2017, Regulation 6(6) – screening opinions valid for 3 years only.Schedule 3 of EIA Regs – cumulative impacts must be assessed.Case law: A failure to properly screen or assess significant effects may render a grant of permission unlawful.Disproportionate growth in Medstead should have triggered a reassessment.

Following this feedback, two further JR Grounds were submitted. But notably, Mr Buxton’s legal instincts were triggered even from the initial summary alone, indicating clear preliminary merit.

This contrasts sharply with the conclusions in the Tilbury Report, commissioned by Medstead Parish Council (MPC), which attempts to downplay or dismiss all legal concerns. This publication explains why Tilbury’s review is procedurally inadequate, legally unstructured, and institutionally conflicted — and why MPC should not rely on it when deciding whether to support JR proceedings.

⚖️ 1. Misapplication of the Tilted Balance – Dismissed Without Legal Test


Council Statement:
Cllr Angela Glass stated during the EHDC Planning Committee meeting on 20 March 2025:

“…if this were to go to appeal, we would probably lose… whether sustainable or not.”

This is a clear misapplication of NPPF Paragraph 11(d)(ii), which allows approval only where adverse impacts do not significantly and demonstrably outweigh benefits.

Tilbury’s comment:

“There was nothing… that suggested to me that the proper application of the ‘tilted balance’ was not understood.”

Why this fails:
He cites no legal framework, applies no test, and ignores on-record statements. His defence relies entirely on assumption — not analysis.

⚠️ 2. Improper Officer Influence – Legal Standards Unacknowledged


What happened:
Officers repeatedly cited past appeal outcomes to discourage councillors from applying their own site-specific judgment.

Tilbury’s response:

“Planning officers and councillors frequently discuss how likely it is they’d win an appeal…”

Why this fails:
Citing appeal precedent is lawful. But using appeal outcomes to suppress policy-based objections is not — a distinction recognised in Wright, Morge, and PPG Paragraph 19. Tilbury does not address this at all.

🏞️ 3. EIA Screening Misuse – Core Facts Omitted


Key facts ignored:

  • Officers relied on a 2013 screening opinion issued under older regulations.
  • That opinion expired in 2017, under Regulation 6(6) of the 2017 EIA Regulations.
  • Screening opinions are not transferrable between developers.
  • No fresh screening was conducted in 2024 despite massive cumulative growth in Medstead.

Tilbury’s review:
Makes no mention of expiry, non-transferability, or cumulative obligations.

Why this fails:
This is not a minor oversight — it’s a total failure to address the legal basis for challenging the decision.

📄 4. Failure to Provide Reasons – Misrepresented in Conclusion


The decision conflicted with multiple development plan policies, applied the tilted balance, attracted major public opposition, and bypassed EIA. These are all triggers for a duty to provide reasons under Oakley, Berkeley, and CPRE Kent.

Tilbury’s view:

“The committee believed it was in accordance with the development plan… that would seem sufficient reason.”

Why this fails:
That is factually incorrect. The development plan was acknowledged as out of date, and the approval relied on NPPF Paragraph 11(d) — a national override. Under Oakley, this creates a duty to explain. Tilbury’s conclusion misstates the legal basis of the decision.

🧩 5. Institutional Conflict – Not Declared


Steve Tilbury is a long-time consultant and trainer to local planning authorities, including those subject to legal scrutiny. He reviewed the legality of a decision made using processes he has helped design and promote.

Why this matters:
This engages the principle of nemo judex in causa sua — no one should be a judge in their own cause. An independent review of legal risk cannot be entrusted to someone professionally embedded in the system under review.

🧾 Conclusion: Why Tilbury’s Review Is Not Fit for Purpose


Steve Tilbury’s report fails to meet the minimum standards required for evaluating legal risk:

  • ❌ It avoids case law.
  • ❌ It applies no structured legal test.
  • ❌ It misrepresents facts and omits critical obligations.
  • ❌ It reflects institutional alignment, not legal neutrality.

By contrast, Richard Buxton’s preliminary review — even based on a three-point summary — identified serious concerns worthy of counsel-level scrutiny.

📣 It is time for Medstead Parish Council to set aside funds to obtain proper legal advice from an independent expert — not rely on reviews that are structurally and legally unfit for purpose. The preliminary reaction from one of the UK’s most respected public law firms has already confirmed that the concerns raised are “problems which need to be looked at properly.” That is the direction MPC should now follow — with transparency, legal integrity, and public accountability.



📢 Correspondence with Damian Hinds MP: Advocating for Planning Reform #PIAF

In May 2025, I wrote to Damian Hinds MP in response to his kind invitation to meet and discuss planning issues. Rather than proceeding immediately to a meeting, I provided a detailed written submission outlining my key concerns and the comprehensive reforms I am proposing.

This approach reflects my view that structured, well-prepared discussions—supported by clear agenda-setting documents such as my Planning Integrity and Accountability Framework (PIAF)—offer the best opportunity for meaningful engagement.

By sharing my framework in advance, I aim to ensure that any future meeting can be as focused and productive as possible, with both sides fully prepared to address substantive issues and questions.

My letter focuses on exposing the structural dysfunctions within the current planning system, particularly how it disadvantages the public while enabling developers and other privileged actors to exploit systemic weaknesses. I highlighted concerns about opaque decision-making, misplaced assumptions of developer good faith, and the absence of meaningful deterrence when planning obligations are breached.

At the heart of my submission is the principle that:

You cannot regulate for delivery while protecting those who profit from non-delivery. Until speculative resistance is broken—through stronger controls, enforcement, and a realignment of incentives—housing targets will remain little more than numbers on a broken scoreboard.


01 – Planning Market Integrity Portfolio (PMI) 🏗️

To restore fairness, accountability, and functional land use in the UK planning system by ensuring land is developed responsibly, transparently, and in alignment with public need — not held speculatively or manipulated for private timing advantages.

02 – Viability Abuse Prevention Portfolio (VAP) 📉

To close the loopholes in viability assessments that allow developers to reduce or eliminate affordable housing obligations, delay delivery, or inflate costs and profits. VAP reasserts local authority control, mandates transparency, and ensures the public shares in development gains — not just in its risks.

03 – Coordinated Enterprise Abuse Prevention Portfolio (CEAP) 🧩

To expose and dismantle coordinated developer abuse within the planning system — including shell company networks, false independence of applicants, and systematic delivery failure. CEAP provides investigatory tools, misconduct tracking, and enterprise-wide enforcement to stop abuse at its organisational root.

04 – Environmental & Infrastructure Assessment Reform Portfolio (EIA) 🌍

To modernise the UK’s Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) screening process and infrastructure analysis tools. This portfolio ensures that cumulative development, real-world service capacity, and environmental resilience are fully factored into planning decisions — especially in vulnerable rural or edge-of-settlement locations.

05 – Points-Based Evaluation & Risk Assessment Portfolio (PERA) 📊

To replace subjective and inconsistent “planning balance” judgements with a national, transparent, and measurable evaluation system. PERA empowers both planning officers and the public with predictable tools, grounded in risk sensitivity, to ensure fairer and more accountable decisions.

06 – Democratic Planning Participation Portfolio (DPP) 🗳️

To ensure that public consultation in planning is meaningful, accessible, and democratically legitimate — not procedural or tokenistic. DPP empowers citizens to participate with clarity, confidence, and traceable impact, transforming planning from an expert-controlled process into a shared civic space.

07 – Nationwide Development Distribution Portfolio (NDD) 🌐

To rebalance housing delivery and spatial planning across the UK by accounting for internal migration trends, digital-era working patterns, and over-concentration in overstretched areas. This portfolio ensures that planning becomes a national strategy, not a disconnected set of local burdens — tackling both overdevelopment and under-utilisation.

08 – Public Sector Delivery & Intervention Portfolio (PSD) 🏛️

To restore public sector leadership in development by equipping local and regional authorities with tools to assemble land, directly deliver homes, and intervene where private actors delay, speculate, or fail to act. PSD ensures the state can lead or rescue development in the public interest — not just wait and hope.

09 – Environmental Performance Portfolio (EPP) 🌱

To raise environmental standards in housing delivery by ensuring that carbon intensity, energy infrastructure, and future efficiency are not afterthoughts — but central, enforceable parts of the planning test. This portfolio prevents development that undermines climate targets and embeds long-term environmental failure.

10 – Planning Governance & Oversight Portfolio (PGO) ⚖️

To build an oversight ecosystem that makes planning enforcement possible, public performance visible, and trust in the system durable. PGO introduces independent roles, institutional audit tools, and national transparency protocols that turn planning from a paper system into an accountable one.

11 – Trusted Developer Accreditation Portfolio (TDA) 🏅

To reward integrity and reliability in development by introducing a national accreditation system that distinguishes trustworthy developers from repeat manipulators. TDA ensures that compliance, transparency, and delivery are not just ethical expectations — but pathways to faster approvals and better access.


📰 Speculative Development as Inverse Harm: Why East Hampshire Needs a Planning Position Statement Now

🧭 What Is a Planning Position Statement (PPS)?


A Planning Position Statement (PPS) is a non-statutory document issued by a Local Planning Authority (LPA) to clarify how it interprets planning policy or evidence in the short term — particularly during periods of policy uncertainty or when a Local Plan is under review.

A PPS is not part of the statutory development plan, but it is a material consideration under planning law. That means it can influence decisions on planning applications and appeals.

It is legally supported by:

  • Section 70(2) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990
  • Section 38(6) of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004
  • Paragraph 48 of the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF), which recognises the relevance of emerging and interim policies

A PPS is especially important when:

  • A five-year housing land supply cannot be demonstrated
  • The “tilted balance” in NPPF Paragraph 11(d) is triggered
  • The harms of development are not being properly accounted for in planning decisions

⚖️ Paragraph 11(d): What Was It Really Meant to Do?


Paragraph 11(d) of the NPPF introduces a presumption in favour of sustainable development when local policies are out of date or a five-year housing land supply is missing.

But crucially, it includes a safety valve:

Planning permission should be granted unless any adverse impacts of doing so would significantly and demonstrably outweigh the benefits, when assessed against the policies in this Framework as a whole.

This clause was designed to ensure that planning decisions still reflect the public interest, not just housing targets. It was never meant to reward unplanned sprawl, unchecked landbanking, or speculative development that exploits technical shortfalls in supply.

Yet that is exactly what is happening.

🏗️ The Inverse Impact of Speculative Development


Note: The term “inverse harm” is used here to describe how speculative development and landbanking not only cause adverse impacts, but actually reverse the intended outcomes of national planning policy — particularly the sustainable development aims of the NPPF. In policy terms, these are adverse impacts under NPPF Paragraph 11(d)(ii), and must be treated as such in decision-making.

When the tilted balance is triggered without safeguards, it:

  • Encourages speculative applications with little regard for cumulative harm
  • Enables landbanking, where permissions are secured but not delivered, inflating perceived supply gaps
  • Overburdens infrastructure with no mechanism for timely mitigation
  • Erodes public trust in planning

These effects are not neutral. They are demonstrable harms.

If the NPPF requires decision-makers to weigh adverse impacts, then speculative behaviour and its systemic consequences must be part of that assessment.

These effects:

  • Undermine the delivery of actually sustainable development
  • Distort land value and delivery patterns
  • Prevent democratic, plan-led growth
  • Delay meaningful infrastructure upgrades

This is precisely the kind of situation Paragraph 11(d)(ii) was built to prevent.

📌 Why a PPS Is the Fastest, Legally Defensible Response


A Planning Position Statement can:

  • Define speculative development and landbanking as adverse impacts with measurable consequences
  • Provide interim criteria or saturation thresholds for assessing cumulative harm
  • Clarify how EHDC interprets the “significantly and demonstrably outweigh” test under current evidence

Because it is evidence-based and locally relevant, it qualifies as a material consideration in decision-making. It empowers the council and the Planning Committee to reject harmful schemes — even under tilted balance.

And crucially: it can be published quickly, without requiring examination or full Local Plan adoption.

🚨 It Is Against the Public Interest Not to Act


To allow speculative development to go unchecked — when its harmful consequences are known and preventable — is to subvert the very purpose of national policy.

  • Paragraph 11(d) was never designed to bypass planning.
  • It exists to balance the need for housing with the right to protect communities, landscapes, and services from unplanned strain.

Not using available tools like a PPS — when harm is demonstrable and growing — is not neutrality. It is a failure to act in the public interest.

🧭 Who Has Been Formally Asked to Act — and Why

We have submitted a formal request for a Planning Position Statement (PPS) to the following elected representatives, all members of the Conservative Party, who hold key responsibilities within East Hampshire District Council (EHDC) and at national level:


Cllr Anthony Williams
Chairman, Planning Committee

Cllr Charles Louisson
Vice-Chairman, Planning Committee


Rt Hon Damian Hinds MP
Member of Parliament for East Hampshire

While MPs do not decide planning policy at district level, Mr Hinds has been informed of this request in his role as constituency representative. We believe he is in a position to:

  • Champion the proposal as a matter of public interest and planning fairness;
  • Encourage EHDC to consider this approach seriously and transparently;
  • Support wider reform at national level to prevent further misuse of the tilted balance.

His support would help ensure the council acts in the spirit of sustainable, plan-led development — not speculative gain.


The request has also been formally shared with all three ward councillors for Four Marks & Medstead — Cllr Roland Richardson (also a Planning Committee member), Cllr Ilena Allsopp, and Cllr Neal Day.

As our elected representatives, they are expected to respond to the concerns of their constituents and take a public position on the call for a Planning Position Statement. Their support could help push EHDC to act decisively .


Cllr Ilena Allsopp
Ward: Four Marks & Medstead

Cllr Neal Day
Ward: Four Marks & Medstead

Cllr Roland Richardson
Ward: Four Marks & Medstead

📣 The Ask


EHDC must urgently issue a targeted Planning Position Statement recognising:

  • That speculative development and landbanking constitute adverse impacts
  • That the cumulative effects in places like South Medstead significantly and demonstrably outweigh the benefits
  • That clear thresholds or local impact triggers are necessary for fair decision-making under tilted balance

Doing nothing is not passive. It is permission by silence.

This is the lawful, rapid, proportionate intervention our district needs — and it is long overdue.

Rapid Local Intervention to Mitigate the Tilted Balance: Temporary Mechanism to Curb Speculative Development

Context:


Where a local planning authority (LPA) cannot demonstrate a five-year housing land supply (5YHLS) or fails the Housing Delivery Test, the “tilted balance” under NPPF Paragraph 11(d) applies. This shifts the presumption in favour of granting permission unless adverse impacts “significantly and demonstrably outweigh” the benefits.

This document proposes a lawful, fast-acting local mechanism to mitigate speculative harm during this vulnerable period.

1. Purpose of the Mechanism:


To ensure that speculative applications — particularly those outside the Local Plan or settlement boundaries — do not benefit automatically from the tilted balance if:

  • The applicant controls deliverable land but chooses not to bring it forward
  • The application undermines infrastructure sequencing, cumulative capacity, or spatial strategy
  • The delivery benefits are overstated or unsupported by commitment

2. Action: Immediate Planning Position Statement (PPS) An LPA may adopt a Planning Position Statement to:


  • Clarify how speculative applications will be assessed during the tilted balance period
  • Establish that developer conduct and local delivery context are material to the planning balance
  • Provide transparency to planning officers, developers, and the public

3. Key Policy Points for PPS:


a. Developer Delivery Behaviour as Material Consideration

  • Where an applicant controls deliverable land and is not progressing it, this undermines their credibility in claiming housing need benefit.
  • Applications may be refused where the applicant has failed to deliver on previously approved or controlled sites.

b. Landholding Declaration Requirement

  • All applicants for major development outside the settlement boundary must submit a declaration of:
    • Land under ownership or option in the district
    • Planning status and delivery timeline
  • Failure to provide this may be treated as a procedural deficiency or reduce the weight of the application’s benefits.

c. Infrastructure & Spatial Harm Threshold

  • Proposals that exacerbate infrastructure deficits or undermine spatial planning objectives will be assessed with enhanced scrutiny.
  • LPAs may treat speculative intrusion into non-strategic locations as harm to plan coherence.

d. Temporary Weight Adjustment Clause

  • The LPA reserves the right to adjust the weight of housing delivery benefits in the planning balance where the applicant’s wider land conduct weakens the credibility or urgency of the claim.

4. Implementation Timeline:


  • Draft PPS in under 14 days
  • Publish and notify via planning portal and website
  • Apply immediately to all new speculative applications
  • Reference in all relevant officer reports and planning committee briefings

5. Legal Basis:


  • PPS is a lawful tool under the LPA’s discretionary power to define planning practice during evolving national policy contexts
  • Material considerations are determined by LPAs under established case law (Cala Homes v SSCLG, 2011)
  • No conflict with NPPF; rather, provides structure for assessing benefits versus adverse impacts more accurately

🚧 How Developers Avoid Delivering Affordable Housing

Although councils are required to seek affordable housing in new developments, many developers find ways to reduce, defer, or avoid this obligation altogether. Here are some of the most common tactics:

1. Viability Assessments


Developers can submit a report claiming that delivering the full affordable housing requirement would make the scheme “financially unviable”. These reports often:

  • Inflate costs or underestimate revenues
  • Use confidential, unaudited assumptions
  • Are difficult for councils to challenge unless reviewed independently

In practice, this has become a routine loophole, especially on complex or high-value sites.

2. Commuted Sums Instead of Homes


Rather than building affordable homes on-site, developers may offer a financial payment to the council. These are called commuted sums.

  • The council can use this money to fund affordable homes elsewhere — in theory.
  • But in reality, off-site delivery is often delayed, uncertain, or never matched to local need.
  • It also breaks the principle of mixed communities — with affordable homes quietly pushed out of market-led developments.

3. Salami Slicing


Developers may split large sites into multiple smaller applications, each falling just below the threshold (e.g. 10 homes or 0.5 ha) required to trigger affordable housing contributions.

  • On paper: “Just a small scheme.”
  • In practice: A large, coordinated development evading obligations through fragmentation.

4. Delaying Detail Until Later Stages


Even when affordable housing is included in outline permission, developers often leave key details — like tenure mix or dwelling type — to be finalised later.

This allows them to:

  • Shift units away from social rent
  • Prioritise leasehold/shared ownership products
  • Reduce quality or mix based on future market shifts

🏡 What Is Affordable Housing?

“Affordable housing” is one of the most commonly used — and misunderstood — terms in planning and housing policy. It’s often used as a shorthand for “cheap homes,” but the reality is more complex and increasingly controversial.

💬 The Official Definition (UK context)


According to the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF), affordable housing refers to housing for sale or rent for those whose needs are not met by the market. It must be available at a cost below market rate, and its affordability must be retained in perpetuity or subject to subsidy recycling.

🔍 Key Types of Affordable Housing


  1. Social Rent
    • The most affordable form
    • Typically managed by councils or housing associations
    • Rent is set using a national formula, usually around 50–60% of market rent
  2. Affordable Rent
    • Introduced by government in 2011
    • Rents can be up to 80% of market levels, making it less affordable in high-cost areas
    • Still classed as “affordable housing” under government definitions
  3. Shared Ownership
    • Buyer purchases a share (usually 25%–75%) and pays rent on the rest
    • Intended as a “step on the ladder” but has been criticised for high combined costs and complex leasehold issues
  4. First Homes (New)
    • Discounted market sale homes (minimum 30% discount for first-time buyers)
    • Must be prioritised for local people, key workers, or younger residents
    • A newer scheme with limited delivery so far

🧮 Is It Really Affordable?


Not always. In places like East Hampshire, where house prices are more than 13 times the average salary, even “affordable rent” and shared ownership are often unattainable for local families.

That’s why many campaigners argue the term “affordable housing” has become detached from real-world affordability — and should be more closely tied to income, not market discounts.

🎯 Why It Matters in Planning


Local councils (like EHDC) are required to secure a proportion of affordable housing in new developments — typically 35–40%, depending on the site. These homes are meant to:

  • Meet local housing needs
  • Support mixed and balanced communities
  • Ensure that key workers, younger people, and those on lower incomes can remain in the area

But whether this promise is kept — and how developers comply — is a major issue in planning today.

👥 Who Needs Affordable Housing — and Why It Matters


The idea that affordable housing is only for “low income” households is outdated and misleading. In districts like East Hampshire, a growing share of the population is priced out of market housing, including:

  • NHS workers, carers, teaching assistants, and emergency services staff
  • Young people unable to rent or buy near where they grew up
  • Families in overcrowded or temporary housing
  • Disabled residents requiring accessible or specialist homes
  • Elderly people downsizing but unable to afford appropriate options locally

Local Reality:

As of 2024, East Hampshire’s affordability ratio is 12.88 — meaning the average home costs over 12 times the average income. That makes even entry-level housing unaffordable to most residents unless they already own property or have external wealth.

Affordable housing isn’t a “bonus” — it’s essential infrastructure.


Without it, communities hollow out, public services suffer staffing shortages, and families are pushed into instability or long commutes. Yet, too often, affordable housing targets are treated as negotiable — or quietly eroded behind technical documents and planning jargon.